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PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: We are delighted to have with us as
our next speaker Professor David Crane from Syracuse Law School, who
has a distinguished career with the federal government, but comes to us
today primarily as the Chief Prosecutor for the Special Court for Sierra
Leone. He is the first United States citizen to have been appointed as a
Chief Prosecutor for an International Criminal Tribunal since
Nuremberg.
In the Federal government, he has had a variety of interesting
positions as Inspector for Federal Procurement and he has also been
counsel to intelligence agencies, and has been on the faculty at the Judge
Advocate General School at the University of Virginia. We are delighted
to welcome him. Please give him a warm welcome.
(Applause)
PROFESSOR CRANE: Good afternoon. It's good to be here in
Penn State. Being a Syracuse graduate as well, I recall that the last time
Syracuse University and Penn State University played, and they played
football against each other for 95 years. When Penn State went to the
Big Ten, of course Syracuse is in the Big East, we stopped playing each
other. It was really quite a rivalry. It went back and forth and for a
while Penn State used to beat us regularly. I have to say that the last
game we ever played with you here Syracuse won. So I thought I'd just
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kind of throw it out kind of as a dig. I graduated from Syracuse
University College of Law in 1980.
PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: Welcome anyway.
PROFESSOR CRANE: Yes, thank you very much. But I've never
been in Happy Valley before so thanks for giving me a chance to come
on over here and talk to you.
I am pleased to add to some really excellent speaking that was going
on and discussion we had this morning.
The 20 th Century-Mankind's Bloodiest Century
Like my colleague Richard, I look at this as a half full glass, not a
half empty glass. We've only been doing this in the modem era for 13
years and look at how far we've come. If you look at the twentieth
century, mankind's bloodiest century, somewhere between 235 million
human beings were killed, 135 million by their own governments. We
don't have a great record in trying to account for mass deaths, mass
killings, mass disappearances, whole chunks of populations disappearing
into the sands of time. As I mentioned this morning, really in my mind
this is the ultimate atrocity.
So we have some attempts. A lot of it politically driven as the
Ambassador talked about, but really it was right in the middle of the
century we had this shining four years where mankind seemed to start
building some cornerstones that we all thought would be the beginning
of accountability in the twentieth century, and sadly the Cold War largely
overwhelmed many of those efforts.
Nuremberg Trials
But just stop and think, from 1945 to 1949 look what we did in the
middle of this gore. We had the Nuremberg Trials, which by the rule of
law closed the book on World War II. We also had the United Nations
created. We had the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We had
the Genocide Convention and we also had the Geneva Conventions of
1949.
So if you look at it in those four years you're going to say my
goodness, we may have gotten it right. Then there is this huge almost
fifty-year gap, forty-year gap where largely nothing was done. We had
such monsters as Idi Amin and others, some people behind the Iron
Curtain who were dealt with appropriately and inappropriately, and we
had the international community take Idi Amin and place him off in
Saudi Arabia for the rest of his life.
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Response to the Horrors of the 1990's
At that point that seemed to be politically the international
community was going is if you had a bad head of state, you corralled him
and took him off somewhere on an island of Elba, so to speak, like
Napoleon. But that's not good enough. Mankind is better than that.
And so we see at the 1990s, just as this horror was kicking off, that
mankind began to develop methodologies by which we could face down
the beast of impunity. I think we should face down the beast of impunity
wherever it rears its ugly head appropriately, and there are many ways
we can do that appropriately.
The Sierra Leone Court-Lessons Learned from Yugoslavia and Rwanda
But in 2002, I was given the opportunity to start a new experiment
in how we dealt with the beast of impunity. That is what I want to talk to
you about today. It is a little bit about the International Tribunal in West
Africa called the Special Court for Sierra Leone, but most importantly I
will talk about lessons learned, because again, we learned a great deal
from our colleagues in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. What we are also
seeing here really is the next generation of an evolutionary process. So
don't get discouraged. We have only been doing this less than 15 years.
You know if a hundred years from now we're still dealing with these
issues, then maybe we can be a little bit concerned, but at this point, as
John Lennon used to say, give peace a chance. All right?
Special Hybrid International War Crimes Tribunal
Let's talk a little bit about where we're going with this. I'll talk a
little bit about why we had the Special Court, why there was a need for a
hybrid international war crimes tribunal. Very briefly talk about just the
court itself. It's a familiar organization, but highlighting some
differences which I think are important to advance the cause of
international criminal law. More importantly we'll talk about lessons
learned because we had a really important seedbed of about three years,
four years, it's still ongoing and it will be completing its work in about a
year, year and a half. But this was a beginning, middle and end of a new
experiment which we could use as a case study as to where this is all
going and what we should expect in the future. I just want also to throw
out the rhetorical question, (and we certainly can talk about it during the
question and answer period hopefully with my colleagues but also with
you out there in television land) of whether we are we delivering the
justice the victims seek. I kind of alluded to that this morning in one of
my comments.
So let's go ahead. But first let me give you the concluding thoughts
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right up front so that when you begin to doze off you got everything that
you needed to know to take the exam at the end of the symposium. Did
they tell you about the exam? Okay.
Regional Hybrids Work
Hybrids work. That's the bottom line. They do work. They are an
important tool in facing down that beast of impunity and I think that's
something that we need to be seriously considering in the future, regional
hybrids work. The key to it is you can shape and mold a mandate in a
way that is necessary for the circumstances by which they are needed.
It's not just a complete cookie cutter approach. We came in and we
adjusted. You can take the mandate and overlay it to the circumstances
by which you need to address the situation, the impunity and the atrocity
that took place.
They are efficient and effective if they have a proper mandate. But
if they're not in the UN system, and we can chat about this, (I have to tell
you that that we are of the UN and not in the UN) and therefore we were
able to quickly move in with our ten-phase plan and get it started.
Within seven months, while we're continuing to build, literally build the
court, (i.e., set up, hire people), we issued eight of the 13 indictments
arresting most of them in a 55 minute arrest operation in Operation
Justice.
The UN couldn't do it. Not because they didn't have the desire or
the people who could do it, it's just that you can't hire people fast
enough to get them in and get them started. It's just a simple fact. It's
not to cast aspersions on the wonderful people that would try, but my
colleagues in the other tribunals looked on with great jealousy on the fact
that if I needed you to come work for me, you came and worked for me.
Within four weeks getting all your shots and just getting you over there,
you could be sitting at your desk and that's allowed me to get this thing
going. It's as simple as that.
Time was a factor. We wanted to show it could be done efficiently
and effectively. This is also something that you need to take away today
it must be accomplished in a politically acceptable time frame. Tribunals
that linger too long begin to fray around the edges and cause problems
and in some ways could be a detractor of peace as opposed to creating a
peace. So we need to be thinking about that.
Of course, because they're flexible, hybrids are perfect compliments
as we talked about this morning to the International Criminal Court. It is
another tool by which the international community can deal with an
atrocity. The reason why that's important is if you go into places like
West Africa in Sierra Leone, when I stepped off the airplane in August of
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2002, there was no place to live, no place to work, there was no running
water, no electricity. The court system largely did not exist and most of
the lawyers had either been killed or fled or incapable of, in fact, of
seeking justice.
Now, in a domestic situation under the Rome Statute in the concept
of complementarity, certainly we would want a domestic court system to
try. But we now have another model when we get into situations where
the domestic system literally does not exist and you can use a regional
hybrid to come in and do the work that is necessary and it compliments
of course the work of the ICC.
And then certainly we have a simple mathematical tool that we have
to have both truth and justice in whatever form that takes itself to create a
sustainable peace. I would posit out to you that if one of those is
missing, a chance of sustainable peace is questionable.
Now, it was a bold new experiment. We had a horrific situation that
took place for ten years in West Africa. I won't get too much into the
gory details other than the fact that at the end of the day a joint criminal
enterprise headed by Muammar Qaddafi, Blaise Compaore of Burkina
Faso, and Charles Taylor of Liberia joined together to geopolitically
influence West Africa. They did so in many, many ways using the
diamond fields of eastern Sierra Leone as a way to finance this particular
joint criminal enterprise. Placed right in the middle of all of this were
gun runners, diamond dealers, terrorists, boy generals, other politicians,
financiers from multinational corporations, et cetera, all in the mix trying
to influence and take advantage of really a place-,where the rule of law
did not exist.
The result of this joint criminal enterprise over a period of about ten
years resulted in the destruction of two countries, and the murder, rape,
maiming and mutilation of over 1.2 million human beings. Now, did you
know about that at all in the nine or ten years that you were alive in the
1990s? No, largely not.
My biggest challenge was the political spectrum and indifference.
People didn't care. How do you, in fact, try to get people to back you
politically, back you financially when it's a politically war weary world
and their interests are elsewhere, such as in the Middle East and in Iraq?
How do you sustain an effort that is actually largely being successful
when the world is looking elsewhere? So it's a huge problem.
But in all of this gore, all of this mess, the President of Sierra Leone
sent a letter to Kofi Annan saying I need help, I can't take care of this. I
can't account for this tragedy. The UN responded and I think responded
in a proper way. It created the Special Court for Sierra Leone in UN
Resolution 1315 in August of 2000. And over a period of two years,
created the framework, this new experiment called a Hybrid International
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War Crimes Tribunal.
Sierra Leone Hybrid Court
Structure
Now, the Special Court is familiar to you if you're a student of
international tribunals. It of course has the chambers which are the
hybrid portion in reality of the court. The statute allows us to use some
aspect of Sierra Leonean law, but also each of the two trial chambers has
a Sierra Leonean judge and two international judges. And then in our
appellate chamber, our court of last resort, it has two Sierra Leoneans
and three internationals. Of course as the prosecutor, I had about 40
percent of my office from Africa and 30 percent of my office was from
Sierra Leone as well. Not only did we have the chambers, but we also
had the registry which runs the court on a daily basis, and my office, the
Office of the Prosecutor.
But what I want to highlight for you is the concept of an office of
the principle defender, which was an idea of the registrar, which I
thought was an excellent idea, and that is to manage the nine trial times
at the time and now ten that were representing the various indictees that
we indicted, which was from Charles Taylor, the sitting president of
Liberia, all the way down to various generals and other ne'er-do-wells
who destroyed this country and bleeding over into Liberia.
So this person made sure that they got the same support that any
other organ of the court as we say was getting. So we believed in the
quality of arms and that they had the same offices, same staff support, as
well as same information, management support to make sure that they
were properly having the capability of defending these individuals
because the key thing to all of this when you're in locations such as we
were, we want to show that the law is fair. Not only that no man is
above the law, but the law is fair because at the end of the day, you have
to remember this, they're the ones that are going to have to live with the
result, not us. So even if they didn't like the result, if they believe it's
fair then certainly we have a positive situation. So that's the Special
Court's organization.
Lessons Learned
Now, lessons learned I think is very, very important. A narrow
mandate is a key to success. My mandate was to prosecute those who
bore the greatest responsibility, and that is the great political compromise
which we were discussing this morning when Richard Goldstone was
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talking about politics, politics and politics, is that the compromise to
create the Special Court for Sierra Leone back in August of 2002 was
greatest responsibility. That is the standard that we're probably going to
most likely see in the future is greatest responsibility. We cannot
prosecute everyone. In the Sierra Leonean situation that would have
been about 35,000 people. In Bosnia and elsewhere, in Rwanda, that
number goes up to tens of thousands.
Greatest responsibility is about 20 people or less in the West Africa
model. That will take about five to six years. If you say most
responsible, that number goes to 100 to 300. That would take about 15
to 25 years to prosecute. If you drop all of the most or greatest and just
say responsible, like I told you that's 35,000. Can't be done. We do
have an impunity gap, yes, but from the international criminal level, you
will throw the baby out with the bath water so to speak if you try and
even attempt to try those who created this tragedy, every one of them. I
would posit to you that one of the lessons learned is a narrow mandate,
greatest responsibility.
I toldyou already inherently flexible. You can shape and mold the
mandate itself to deal with whatever you need. You can have an
internationalized domestic court or you can have a domestic court, a
hybrid model in some way, or you can have an international tribunal like
the Special Court. You can shape it depending on the political will of the
region as well as the international community.
Another key is to place the tribunal if you can right where the
crimes took place. The Sierra Leonean people, West Africans saw
justice done right in front of their eyes, beginning, middle and an end.
Another key aspect is outreach. Outreach is an absolute key to
success. We developed a town hall program where I literally walked the
entire countryside the first four months I was there listening to my client
tell me what took place. So they could see their prosecutor and they
could begin to understand in some ways what we were all about. And
for three years during my tenure there, I went back upcountry and
explained to them what we were doing and listened to them tell me how
things were going from their perspective. Very, very critical. Outreach
is an absolute key to success.
Of course we also had a legacy program, which means we want to
leave something with the people of West Africa when we leave, not just
a just result. So we were training prosecutors, we were training Sierra
Leonean police, we were training investigators, and also case managers
in how to deal with complex cases. These fine men and women from
Sierra Leone remain in Sierra Leone to begin to rebuild their missing
justice system. So legacy is also very important.
I've already told you that the UN is important only to a limited
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degree. Politically it's important. It's important as far as oversight, but
if you put a tribunal right into the UN system it gets lost into the UN
system. I think that it is very, very important for us to understand that
through "of the UN" and not "in the UN" you can accomplish your
narrow mandate.
As I told you also truth plus justice equals a sustainable peace. You
have to have some type of truth capability. When I went to Sierra Leone,
my prosecutorial philosophy was we can't try every tragedy, we can't
account for every human being that was destroyed. So we did
representational charging, picking areas that represent the gravamen of
the entire conflict so that we could for history purposes as well for justice
purposes account for that, but we didn't go out and do all of it.
Notice Pleading
We also did something for the first time in international criminal
justice, and that is notice pleading. That is we just had very narrow
specific charges in our indictments. I was brought up if you plead it, you
prove it. And instead of having 80, 90 page indictments, the longest
page wise indictment we had was about 20 pages, and that was a 17
count indictment of Charles Taylor. So again, those have been sustained
judicially and so I think that that's something that we need to be
considering. We can talk a little bit more about some of the legal
groundbreaking decisions that were made relating to heads of state, child
soldiers, gender crimes, what have you at a later time.
Establishing Rapport with the Local Population
The challenges like I've told you were indifference and state
support. No one cared. I would travel and I have to tell you that 70
percent of my time once we got our ten-phase plan in place, and we're in
phase ten right now, and that is the trial phase. Once we got that going
and all the wonderful people that worked for me were doing their thing, I
basically traveled the world trying to keep the world focused enough to
keep the money coming and also keeping the political support. It's
absolutely critical in a Chief Prosecutor's position. If not, that support
will actually disappear despite your successes. I'm not saying that we
were perfect, but I think that we have shown that a hybrid does work, and
despite the success, we were still having major challenges funding as
well as just interest. I think that that is very, very critical as far as
keeping the international criminal justice model moving forward.
The key question I want to ask you is the justice we seek the justice
they want. I call it the spaceship phenomenon. I'll give you a real quick
example in our town hall meetings. The first one I went to was in
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Kenema right in the heart of the diamond fields, right in the heart where
the whole thing started in 1991. I did that of course symbolically as well.
A week prior we go out talking to the paramount chief, the district
officer, seek his permission to do this was always granted. The day
before UN peacekeepers would come in and secure the area, so there
would be a lot of blue helmets around. The day of the event they would
secure the landing zone. They would hear this big chopper, an MI-8
Russian from the Ukraine come whopping in and land, big UN, white
thing. Many of the Sierra Leoneans thought that the helicopter was an
animate object.
So here we have this individual and you land, all the police are there
and the peacekeepers are ringing the landing zone and the ramp comes
down and out walks me. Some of them had never seen a white man
before, particularly a blond white man. It was like the Day the Earth
Stood Still, that movie where the flying saucer lands in the mall.
But the point is that how do you go from that phenomenon and they
literally shrank back. How do you go from that moment to where you're
standing in front of them after three hours, you're weeping, crying,
talking, meeting with them and they're telling you stories beyond belief?
How do you do that? Well, that's very, very important to understand the
cultural approach to international criminal justice. I was fortunate, I
have a master's degree in West African studies. So I had a perspective
that was helpful and I understood that family was a very important part, a
very important part of society in West Africa.
So instead of standing in front of them saying I'm David Crane, I'm
the Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court and I'm here to help you, not.
Instead of standing at the high table like this, I walked among them and I
would tell them about my family. I would say I'm Dave Crane from the
State of North Carolina, talk about my wife, my children, my pets. Huge
laughter begins. Talked about our cat named Uncle Skeeter. Uncle
Skeeter became the most popular animal in Sierra Leone. I was asked all
the time about how is Uncle Skeeter.
Then I would tell them myself and the wonderful people that work
for me have left their families from all over the world and I've left my
family in the United States and I was wondering if you would give me
the honor and the privilege at least today of being a part of your family.
The tension would just drain out of the room. People would applaud,
they came up and hugged me in welcome. Then after things kind of
settled down, I said now that you've given me the honor of being a part
of your family, let's talk. And for three hours I would stand in front of
them listening to them tell me what took place in Kenema and Port Loko
and Pujehun, wherever it may be.
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Three Joint Criminal Trials
When we left, I had a better feeling about what took place, they had
a better feeling about their prosecutor who understood somewhat what
they went through, and then we began to build and work on our
investigations and our witness management program, et cetera. So that
at the end of the day we ended up having three joint criminal trials, plus
Charles Taylor, it would have been three criminal trials if we had Charles
Taylor, but that's a political issue and we won't talk about that now. But
the point is that we had 395 witnesses, 393 showed up. Because the case
was not a Nuremberg case, we didn't have trainloads of documents. We
had witnesses, human beings, Sierra Leoneans and West Africans who
came proudly and with great dignity. And it's a powerful, powerful
scene to see these people being brought into the courtroom, some of
them literally have to be carried because they're missing all of their
limbs. Sitting there pointing at these individuals because they don't have
a hand saying you did this to me. And then watching them limp, walk,
be carried out of the courtroom with their head held high because they
represented their family, their town and in their own way sought justice.
And that is justice. That is what international criminal justice is about is
that very moment when that victim walks out past these individuals with
their head held high.
So I just want to throw this out to you, it's important, we need to, in
fact, enforce international norms, but we need to always consider other
alternatives and ways we can make it palatable for the people. Those are
the concluding thoughts again. You've seen it. I've already put this up
front, and that is the hybrid system does work. It is a tool in a kit bag of
the international community to face down the beast of impunity. With
that, I will just leave that with you and I look forward very much just
having a dialogue now and for the rest of the day. Thank you very much.
(Applause)
PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: Any comments from the panel? Yes.
JUDGE GOLDSTONE: I have a question for David, and that is I'd
very much like to know his views on the Charles Taylor trial being held
in the Hague. What were the arguments going on? I know there were
many of them going both ways. I think it would be interesting to get
your assessment if it was up to you to decide, what you would have
decided.
PROFESSOR CRANE: We knew we were eventually going to get
Charles Taylor. We were hoping that we'd get him sooner than later, but
we got him and that's all that counts. It matters that he be fairly
prosecuted wherever he may be, but our initial plan was to get him out of
West Africa just until the dust settles. We were looking at putting him
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someplace such as the ICC or the Hague just during the pre-trial process
and let things kind of settle down emotionally and politically and then we
would bring him back to trial in Freetown and I always felt and still feel
that he should be tried in Freetown. However, I'm not going to second
guess the President of the Court, who had been requested by both the
presidents of Sierra Leone and Liberia, of having him tried elsewhere.
Our Article Four of our statute allows us to try a case anywhere in the
world that is necessary. It's basically our get out of town-actually call
it our-what was the term in the movie MASH? Bug out. If things got
really hot and heavy, we literally could pack our bags and reconstitute
anywhere in West Africa or the world.
So they moved him to the Hague. He'll be prosecuted not by the
ICC. The AP got a little bit of wording wrong here. The impression was
that the ICC was going to prosecute Charles Taylor. We've borrowed a
courtroom from the International Criminal Court, but he will be tried in
the Hague by our Trial Chamber Number Two in April of next year.
And that trial will last about a year on an 11 count indictment for various
war crimes and crimes against humanity.
I think Richard brings up a very important question. As you were
listening to my talk, the beauty of hybrid is it's there and the victims get
to see it. It's a challenge for other colleagues and other tribunals because
they're not there. The test was well, let's see if we can do it right in the
middle of the crime scene. It's been shown that if the security can be
appropriate and that you can do this, the benefits are just incredible.
However, it's not going to happen. I wish it would have happened.
I can respect the fact that security is one of the criteria by which you
have to always be mindful. It is there. It's a tenuous situation. Let me
give you just a real quick vignette. I was giving a speech at the
University of Western Ontario and I knew that he was being brought
back to Sierra Leone, and I had asked that you call the minute he lands in
the compound. I mean obviously I've lived and breathed my entire time
there to see him come.
So my former special assistant called me in tears, right in the middle
of the speech I was giving. What she was telling me is that Special Court
in which we built sits in kind of a bowl and there are hills and houses all
around it and there were tens of thousands of Sierra Leoneans cheering
as Charles Taylor stepped off the back of that MI-8 helicopter. It was a
very special moment for all of us, mankind, to see the most powerful
warlord in Africa humbled before the law. I think that that was a
tremendous moment for the Sierra Leoneans and also a moment for
international criminal justice. It would have been nice to see him tried
there, but remember he was arraigned in front of the world in that
courtroom, Trial Chamber Number Two. You've seen those pictures of
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him being humbly led in handcuffs. Again these are special moments for
international justice.
JUDGE GOLDSTONE: What are the prospects of the trial being
broadcast on radio and television in Sierra Leone?
PROFESSOR CRANE: Well, it's a logistic problem of course.
They are going to do that. They are going to try to broadcast. We have
an outreach section. We have outreach teams. We have a district
outreach officer in every single district in Sierra Leone. We videotape
all of the proceedings. You know in a country that doesn't have any
communications other than listening to BBC Focus on Africa on a
hand-cranked radio in many parts of the country, we would literally tape
everything. We have mobile TV units that go out and we literally show
the trial, just traveling road shows all the time. It's going to be a
challenge. The intent is to broadcast it to the extent that they can in
Sierra Leone and West Africa. Those logistics are being worked out.
Obviously, there are challenges relating to bringing witnesses to the
Hague, but it will be done and it will be at a cost, but again it is what it is
as we always said. It will be a logistic challenge, but it will be done.
PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: Further questions or comments? Yes.
STUDENT: Over the years, there have been a series of cases of
criminal offenses in countries of Africa under military government but
the United Nations did little or nothing. The only thing the United
Nations has done is to sanction the country, but the military governments
do not have any regard for the United Nations. What is the United
Nations accomplishing the countries ruled by the military government?
AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON: I think it is hard to say what the
United Nations is doing across the board. I think every country has to be
taken individually. This is one of the problems in the West. Too often
people tend to paint Africa with one brush. They sort of take, you know,
what happened in one place and apply it everywhere else. Every country
is distinct. Every country is unique. So again I think it depends on the
situation in any given country.
One of the things that has been a problem in Sudan, for example, is
that the international community has sought support from other African
leaders on how to respond to Sudan. Very few of the African leaders
have been willing to speak up and to criticize the Sudanese government
or to speak strongly about what is going on there. We see the same sort
of thing with Mugabe in Zimbabwe. The government's other political
leaders have been unwilling to speak out. So it has been difficult to get
buy-in from people on the continent to international solutions. We still
see this ongoing with Sudan.
Richard, as an African, you might be in a better position to answer
some of this than I am.
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STUDENT: As an example, Nigeria and the military government in
1992. The United Nations tried to intervene, but there was restraint on
the part of United Nations. People begin to wonder what is the United
Nations, what are they up to if they cannot intervene in some kind of
way? This has been persistent over the years, not only in Nigeria, but in
every part of Africa, because military government is the rule. Democracy
cannot find its roots. This situation has generated much controversy. I'll
be glad if that can be addressed.
AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON: Well, I'll start and maybe
somebody else may wish to jump in. Decisions taken at the UN are
taken by the member states. The UN as an organization often is
responsible for implementing decisions. Like for example the UN
peacekeeping operations goes out and runs a peacekeeping operation in a
given country where one is set up. However such operations are
mandated by the Security Council.
So in order to authorize action by the UN, action by the member
states is required. Going back to what I was saying a minute ago, the
international community has tried to get African buy-in to do this. I
think people are reluctant for the UN to act and for it to be seen as
outsiders intervening without the support of people on the continent. It
has proved very difficult to get this kind of support. Sudan again is a
prime example where governments that have been interested in getting
the UN peacekeeping force there have sought the support of African
leaders neighboring Sudan and from all parts of the continent to put
pressure on the Sudanese government to accept a UN peacekeeping
force. A few have been willing to do this, but as a whole they have not.
The African Union has not taken a very active position on this. Your
president, President Obasanjo is the first one who has actually come out
and said that there might be a genocide going on in Sudan. He's the first
African leader to do that.
But the point you make I think is a valid one that because a lot of
these people, a lot of the leadership in African countries are military
dictatorships or whatever they have, you know, corruption or big
problems of their own, they have been unwilling to throw stones. You
know the saying people in glass houses don't throw stones. They don't
want to criticize another leader or to authorize some sort of outside
intervention for fear that the same thing might happen to them one day.
It is very difficult problems to overcome. I think we are trying to
work through this. There are some progressive leaders on the continent
who are trying to get past this. There are people in the African Union
who have the intent to get past it, but it's a slow process.
JUDGE GOLDSTONE: I would just add briefly I agree with
everything that Clint has said. I think one of the weaknesses of African
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leadership is this reticence or refusal for African leaders to publicly
criticize each other. And I think the attitude to Mugabe is the best
example. No African leader has really spoken up. I think Archbishop
Desmond Tutu is the only person who has consistently spoken up
although more recently President Mandela has spoken up.
I'm not sure it isn't a part of a postcolonial syndrome. I think it's
going to take Africa more time than it's taken to recover from
colonialism. I think there is what I regard an unfortunate refusal to be
critical. In South Africa, I think President Mbeki's refusal to publicly
criticize what's happening in Zimbabwe is wrong. Not that it would
have made any difference. I don't think that anything that South Africa
said or did would have changed one thing in Zimbabwe. I'm
disappointed because I think President Mbeki should have been highly
critical for our own people. I think he should have said this is not the
way, this will never happen in South Africa, this is not the way
democracies operate, but he hasn't, and I think that's a disappointment.
As far as the UN is concerned, I think it's a little unfair to criticize
the UN for the reason that Clint has given. The UN can't do any more or
less than its member states will allow. There's no such thing as the UN
doing this or the UN doing that out of its own volition. Implementation
at the UN is often justifiably criticized for bad implementation, whether
it's corruption, Oil for Food, or inefficiency in peacekeeping or whatever
the case may be. However, the policies are not set by the UN. They're
set by the Security Council in most cases and sometimes by the General
Assembly.
PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: Next question please.
STUDENT: We have been talking about the procedure for the
taking of evidence in international criminal trials. I must confess I was
impressed by hearing the numbers of witnesses from Sierra Leone that
decided to show up and testify against those individuals. I was
wondering are there special measures which are adopted to protect those
witnesses for and after the trial in order to prevent revenge against them
or their families?
PROFESSOR CRANE: Well, I'm glad you asked. There is. We
immediately sought and were granted a very sweeping protective order to
protect the individuals. We had extensive judicially directed and other
ways of protecting all the witnesses. They were given numbers, they
were brought in, et cetera. We also did something that is somewhat
unique in the Office of the Prosecutor. Each tribunal has a victim
witness management unit that kind of protects individuals when they
come into the court and gets them oriented and focused as to their
testimony. But prior to that, there was largely nothing done.
What we did was build what we call a Witness Management Unit in
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the Office of Prosecutor. We took the Canadian and U.S. model and
overlaid that and then 395 persons actually testified. The total was over
500 when we were investigating. We went out and monitored every
person that was going to testify, and met with them on a regular basis. If
it was a gender crime victim, we had gender crime investigators and
psychosocial workers would have either worked with these individuals to
get them to agree to meet with us. In some cases it took two years before
they actually walked in. I mean how do you get a Muslim woman who
has been raped 40 times living upcountry to agree to come down and
give her testimony at the international tribunal level, never having been
to Freetown whatsoever?
We were not only accounting for them, we were also protecting
them. We are always monitoring their particular area. We coded them.
If they were potentially going to be injured, we would move them. There
were several times when we had to move people in Sierra Leone to West
Africa or even outside Africa. Some of them are in deep protection
because they will die if found. But they were protected. They were
brought in.
Most importantly and part of the legacy program was to train an
entire unit of Sierra Leone police, which was part of my office during
this time frame, in post-trial protection and support methods. This
particular unit is watching and monitoring and working with these
victims who have gone through this tragedy because they've got to relive
it again. When you're testifying, you got to relive that traumatic
situation. They need help afterwards. So we are training Sierra
Leoneans to have this unit which when we leave will be literally
transferred right back into the Sierra Leone police and we'll continue to
monitor them as well as to start training other investigators to, in fact,
take care of things. It's very, very critical and it's necessary because
when you only have testimony from witnesses and no paper, you've got
to take care of them, because our concern is if you lose one, one dies
publicly, all of a sudden they all disappear and there goes your case.
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